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The Azerbaijan Pillar
Carlo Frappi
Introduction
Over the last twenty-five years and since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, the Southern Caucasus has come to play a relevant—and in 
some case pivotal—role to Turkish foreign policy. The relevance of the 
area to Ankara’s foreign policy results primarily from the central role it 
gained within what >esser (2000, p. 205) called the ͞double coupling͟ 
dilemma1. It refers to the need for Turkey in the post-Cold tar era to 
reinvent and relaunch its relations with the testern partners, while 
simultaneously trying to exploit the regional ͞windows of opportunities͟ 
disclosed by the Soviet Union’s dissolution. Theorized with reference to 
the first phase of the post-bipolar era, the double coupling dilemma in 
its essence—i.e. the need to find a balance between global and region-
al aims, projections and alliances—seems instead to cut across all the 
post-1991 Turkish foreign policy (Frappi 2008), standing as a the main 
reason behind the continuous relevance of the Caucasus area.
There are two structural elements, with deep historical roots, 
which underlie the Turkish projection towards the Southern Caucasus: 
these elements, intertwining with regional trends, marked the course 
of Ankara’s regional foreign policy in the aftermath of the USSR’s 
dissolution. The first of them consists in the ethno-linguistic aĸnity 
between Turkey and Azerbaijan—embodied by the widespread motto 
͞one nation two states͟—which, ever since the first half of the 1990s, 
supported and facilitated the formation of a privileged partnership 
between the two countries. The second and opposite element is giv-
1 In the same vain, Kramer (2000), pp. 93-94. 
116 en by the deep scar dividing Turkey and Armenia. It results primarily 
from the historical memory of the ͞Great Evil͟—the extermination and 
deportation of the Armenian population settled in Central and Eastern 
Anatolia by the Ottoman authorities between 1915 and 1923—to which 
zerevan traditionally advocates the recognition of a genocidal nature, 
both from Turkey and at the international level. Far from bearing a 
mere historical or historicist nature, the genocide Ƌuarrel has a strong 
political and diplomatic connotation. The recognition of the genocide 
nature to the events following April 1915 could in fact pave the way for 
compensation demands, whose uncertain nature and entity represent 
a significant threat to Turkish national interests. Even more so when 
taking into consideration, on the one hand, the revanchism inscribed 
in the founding documents of the Republic of Armenia2 and, on the 
other hand, Ankara’s traditional ͞besieged fortress͟ mentality3. Against 
this backdrop, Turkish policy toward the Southern Caucasus has been 
revolving around three parallel yet connected tracks, i.e. the simultane-
ous attempts to progressively strengthen the entente with Azerbaijan, 
to engage Georgia as a vital physical and political link with the latter, 
and—finally—to contain Armenia.
Notwithstanding the relevant role played by identity elements in 
shaping the relations between Turkey and the Caucasian countries, it 
would be nonetheless misleading to assign them a priority role. Rather, 
Ankara’s Caucasus policy can be better assessed by taking into consider-
ation the Turkish decision-makers’ rational resolve to advance national 
interest and maximize state power within the international and regional 
systems through a cost-benefit analysis. This behavioral pattern—although 
it is still Ƌuite common to hear policymakers in both Ankara and Baku 
making use of the ͞one nation two states͟ rhetoric—seems to apply also 
to the relations with Azerbaijan4, which is by far the most important 
regional partner and a strategic actor facilitating Turkey’s resolve to 
project its inŇuence in a multi-regional direction.
Besides aiming at highlighting the rationale behind the formation 
of the Turkish-Azerbaijani strategic axis, this chapter focuses on the 
2 Besides the ambiguity still surrounding the Armenian recognition of the Kars and 
Gyumri Treaties (1921) fixing the borders between the two countries, Armenian Declaration of 
Independence—itself recalled by the country’s Constitution—refers, at article no.11, to the Eastern 
Anatolia as ͞testern Armenia .͟
3 See :ung (2003).
4 See, for instance, Cornell (2001); Uzer (2011). For an opposite view—i.e. assigning 
priority to identity factor—see Murinson (2010). See also BozdaŒlioŒlu (2003).
117bargaining power balance within the axis itself. It aims at demonstrating 
the progressive but steady reduction in power asymmetry between the 
two partners as well as the constraints to Ankara’s room for regional 
diplomatic maneuver resulting from it. Indeed, the main contention 
of the chapter is that the course of Turkish foreign policy toward the 
Caucasus is not merely ͞centered͟ on Baku—as used to be the case 
in the ͚90s5—but is rather inŇuenced by Azerbaijan as well as by the 
common partnership agenda.
Against this backdrop, this chapter will focus on energy coopera-
tion between Turkey and Azerbaijan, presented as the backbone of the 
partnership, providing the latter with an interdependent feature and 
enabling both actors to pursue respective yet convergent economic and 
foreign policy goals. Therefore, building upon the political geography 
literature, the paper will portrait the Ankara-Baku axis within the wider 
context of the relations between a land-locked and a transit country. 
This will help in assessing the key drivers of the Turkish-Azerbaijani 
relation, the changing balance in bargaining power within the relation 
itself, as well as, finally, its evolution as a conseƋuence of the Azerbai-
jani energy strategy. 
The dependency relation ďetǁeen an energy producer and a transit state
The Azerbaijan’s main geopolitical asset is given by significant hydrocar-
bonits reserves, coupled with a strategic geographic position making the 
country a natural ͞cork in the bottle͟ (Brzezinski 1997, pp. 46-47) for 
the wider reserves of the Caspian Sea area. Indeed, although the total 
volume of Azerbaijani oil and gas reserves cannot compete with the ones 
available in other regional producer states, nevertheless the possibility 
for many of the latter to reach European markets without transiting 
through the Russian pipeline network almost necessarily involves the 
passage trough Azerbaijani territory. Thus, it was exactly the ͞double 
role͟ played by Azerbaijan in the regional energy game—as a producer 
and potential transit country—that established Baku’s post-bipolar rel-
evance to regional and extra-regional actors. Among the latter, Turkey 
took a front position ever since the acƋuisition of independence of the 
Caucasian Republic and the opening of the national hydrocarbon sector 
to foreign capitals and technologies. Consistently, energy cooperation 
5 The article borrows the expression from BƂlƺkbasi (1997), pp. 80-94.
118 became the backbone for the formation and successive strengthening 
of the bilateral axis.
zet, as far as the Azerbaijani energy sector is concerned, subsoil 
wealth as a source of power and positive geo-political asset has to be 
balanced with a limiting factor, given by the landlocked condition of 
the country6. Such a condition implies that, in order to translate the 
extractive potential into economic and political advantages, the producing 
states need to interact and cooperate with the transit one(s) in order 
to cover the physical distance toward international outlets or consum-
ing countries. In turn, the need for cooperation with transit state(s) 
generates a politically relevant dependency relationship between the 
latter and the landlocked countries. That is, the lack of access to the 
sea necessarily results in a condition of ͞political land-lockness͟ (Anglin 
1973, p. 112), since the the land-locked countries find themselves being 
dependent on the transit states’ infrastructures, on peace and stability 
in their territories, on their administrative practices and, ultimately, on 
sound cross-border political relations7. Therefore, the Azerbaijani choice 
of Turkey as the main window to final energy markets—resulting from 
both economic and political calculations8—generated a dependency 
relation, which widened the already broad power asymmetry dividing 
the two partners in the aftermath of Soviet dissolution.
The dependency condition characterizing Azerbaijan’s position vis 
à vis Turkey as key transit country was further deepened by three basic 
factors impinging upon the degree of land-lockedness. This feature, far 
from being assessed merely in absolute terms, has to be evaluated also 
in relative ones9—that is, keeping in consideration both the geographical 
location of the land-locked country and the peculiarities associated with 
energy trading compared to other types of goods. 
6 The possibility for Azerbaijan to access the solga River does not prevent the country 
to fall within the landlocked states category. Indeed, besides seasonal restrictions in accessing 
the River, the category under consideration includes, according to Glassner, those states, ͞which 
have access to the sea via internationalized navigable rivers ͙ Such states exhibit some of the 
characteristics of coastal states, but consider themselves land-locked and are here considered 
land-locked because they do not exercise ͚sovereign’ control over their aƋueous highways to the 
sea͟ (Glassner 1970, p. 2).
7 See Faye et al. (2004), pp. 31-68.
8 See Idan and Shaīer (2011), pp. 257-258.
9 According to Anglin (1973) p. 112, ͞the measure of land-lockedness’, or the extent to 
which a country suīers economically or otherwise from its land-locked situation depends upon a 
complex combination of geographical, economic, political and psychological factors .͟
119The first of these factors results from the characteristic ͞rigidity͟ 
of the trade in hydrocarbons, and particularly in natural gas. Indeed, 
gas commercialization from a land-locked country by definition reƋuires 
intubation, i.e. the laying of infrastructures that, once commissioned, bind 
together over the long-term producer, transit and consuming countries. 
Such rigidity—which naturally presupposes a minimal degree of political 
entente among the involved actors—applies also to the oil sector in the 
case of countries having no direct access to port terminals. Therefore, 
for the land-locked countries the rigidity of the trade in hydrocarbons 
ultimately results in an increase in the degree of physical isolation, since 
they suīer from the lack of alternative export routes both within and 
outside the transit country. The economic losses associated with the 
occasional interruption of the oil Ňows through the main Azerbaijani oil 
export pipeline—i.e. the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyan (BTC)—perfectly epitomize 
the risk and the vulnerability associated with the lack of alternative 
export routes for hydrocarbons10. In turn, any increase in the degree 
of isolation brings about a deepening of the political dependency upon 
transit state(s) along the above-mentioned four vectors.
Secondly, land-lockedness varies proportionally with the number 
of countries to be crossed in order to reach international outlets or final 
markets. As per Azerbaijan, the choice of the Anatolian-Mediterranean 
export route for national hydrocarbons resulted in the country de facto 
assuming a ͞double land-locked͟ position, being Georgia the indis-
pensable physical—and political—link between Azerbaijan and Turkey. 
The preference accorded to the Anatolian-Mediterranean route by the 
Azerbaijani economic and political decision makers not only multiplied 
Baku’s ͞political land-lockedness͟ vis à vis transit countries, but also 
entailed a longer distance to be covered in order to reach international 
outlets and markets. thile the physical distance between the land-
locked country’s border and the final outlets per se represents a factor 
worsening the degree of isolation, it is all the more relevant in case 
of trade in hydrocarbons. Indeed, the longer the distance, the higher 
the infrastructural investments reƋuired and, therefore, the longer the 
payback time for investors and the deeper the necessity for cooperation 
reƋuired between exporting and transit countries.
The third and last factor impinging upon the measure of land-lock-
edness—and conseƋuentially on the degree of political dependence on 
10 For example, the 19 days long interruption of the oil Ňow occurred during the 2008 
Russo-Georgian ͞Five-days tar͟ resulted in a loss of about 1 billion US dollars in export revenue 
for Azerbaijan (Robertson and Riley 2014).
120 transit states—has to do with the relative importance of transit trade 
for the country’s economy, that is land-lockedness varies with the 
proportion of transit trade to total trade, as well as with the ratio of 
external trade to gross national product. As far as Azerbaijani energy 
exports are concerned, ever since the commissioning of the main oil 
and gas pipelines originating in the country—i.e. the rehabilitation of the 
Baku-Supsa oil pipeline (1999) and the inauguration of the BTC (2005) 
and the Southern Caucasus gas Pipeline (SCP, 2006)—hydrocarbon export 
gained a vital role for both external annual turnover and GDP11. Such 
a vital role, in the wider context of a still-to-be-achieved diversification 
of the national productive apparatus, makes Azerbaijan all the more 
dependent on both Georgia and Turkey as energy transit states.
Moreover, more often than not the relevance of hydrocarbon 
trade to energy-exporting countries—and in particular to developing 
ones—goes well beyond the mere economic benefit to the state budget, 
acƋuiring a deeper significance in both political and institutional terms. 
This is especially the case for the so called ͞rentier state .͟ This expression 
refers to those states founding their budget upon revenues from external 
rents rather than upon taxation of domestic productive activities and 
which, being independent from society, ͞directly or indirectly supports 
a large part of the latter through the process of spending domestically 
the rent that it receives from the rest of the world͟ (>uciani 2013, p. 
92). thile the applicability of the rentier state label to Azerbaijan and 
its eventual domestic conseƋuences falls outside the aims of this chap-
ter12, it is nevertheless indisputable that resource wealth served not 
only as a tool to get out of the economic hardship following the USSR’s 
dissolution, but also as a vehicle to build consensus ͚internally’ and to 
improve geopolitical relevance vis à vis consumer countries externally. 
Thus, the energy sector played a ͞double legitimizing role ,͟ which pro-
vided the country with a typical ͞petro-state͟ posture13 and which, in 
the end, widened the scope of its land-locked condition.
11 Since 2005 and until the drop in oil price resulting from the 2008 international crisis, 
natural resources rents stood around 65й of annual GDP. Since then, the natural resources’ share 
of the GDP fell progressively up to 29й in 2014 (torld Bank 2016). 
12 See Franke et al. (2009); Meissner (2010); >uecke and Trofimenko (2008).
13 See Alieva (2009), pp. 112-119. See also O’>ear, (2007); Guliyev (2013).
121^caling doǁn dependency: ǌerďaiũan’s energy posture and strategy 
toǁard Turkey 
Assessing the degree of land-lockedness in relative terms implies con-
sidering also those factors which inversely aīect the degree itself and 
which, therefore, may act in reducing the measure of land-lockedness 
and the associated political dependency. For the present case study, four 
factors come into play14: (a) the benefits the transit states derive from 
the transit trade; (b) the interest of third parties in the transit trade; (c) 
the land-locked country’s retaliatory capability; (d) the degree of control 
the land-locked state exercises over the transport systems. thile the 
first factor seems to work eminently outside of Baku’s control, the same 
does not hold true for the other three factors. By eīectively exploiting 
the factors endogenous to the bilateral relation, Azerbaijan managed 
over time to progressively reduce the power imbalance vis à vis Turkey.
dhe ďeneĮts the transit states derive from the transit trade
The benefits Turkey derives from energy trade are as relevant as mul-
tifaceted, going well beyond the mere—yet significant—oil and gas 
transit fees15. From a purely economic standpoint, the benefits resulting 
from Turkey’s active involvement in the exploitation and transportation 
of Azerbaijani oil and gas resources have been three-fold. First, in the 
absence of significant indigenous reserves, it has ensured Turkey the 
possibility of meeting the increasing energy demand coming from a 
Ƌuick-developing economy16. This trend has been particularly marked in 
the natural gas sector. Indeed, although natural gas entered the national 
energy mix only towards the end of the ͚80s, its annual Ƌuota of total 
consumption grew steadily until becoming the first fuel in Turkey’s energy 
basket, surpassing both coal and oil17. Besides the Ƌuantitative increase 
in gas consumption—making Turkey the fourth largest European market 
14 For the complete list of factors scaling down the land-locked country’s dependency 
measure see Anglin (1973), pp. 113-116.
15 The amount of revenues in transit fees from BTC and SCP is not disclosed by either 
Turkish national oil company (BOTAS) or governmental sources. ,owever, on the eve of BTC com-
missioning a senior Turkish government oĸcer expected them to reach the amount of 300 million 
USD per year on average during the lifetime of the project (Babali 2005, p. 46).
16 In between 1991 and 2015 Turkey’s primary energy consumption grew from 48,8 to 
131,3 million tonnes of oil eƋuivalent (Mtoe) (BP 2016).
17 Notwithstanding an annual decrease on a year-on-year basis, in 2015 natural gas 
accounted for 39,2й of total primary energy consumption (ibid.)
122 behind Germany, France, and Italy—the upward trend in its domestic 
demand came along with an increase in its strategic significance, as 
the resource currently accounts for 37.8й of total electricity generation 
and for 28.7й of the national installed power capacity (Republic of 
Turkey 2016). In this context, the inauguration of a gas supply channel 
from Azerbaijan in 2006 was all the more relevant to Turkey, allowing 
the country to satisfy both current and forecasted demand. Currently, 
around 11й of annual gas import—i.e. 5.3 billion cubic meters per year 
(bcm/y)—is provided through the SCP by the output of the Azerbaijani 
oī-shore Shah Deniz field (BP 2016, author’s calculation). Moreover, 
on the basis of the intergovernmental agreement signed in October 
2011, the second phase of the field’s development will ensure Turkey 
6 additional Gmc per year from 2018—potentially doubling Azerbaijan’s 
gas market Ƌuota by the end of the decade.
Azerbaijani hydrocarbons are significant to Turkey not only in order 
to meet current and forthcoming domestic energy demands, but also 
in diversifying its supply sources. The sources’ diversification—a crucial 
element to safeguard the importing countries’ energy security and one of 
the pillars of Ankara’s energy strategy (Republic of Turkey 2016)—stands 
as the second benefit ensured to Turkey by the development of the en-
ergy partnership with Azerbaijan, in both the oil and gas sector. thile 
important to the former, such benefits stand as crucial to the gas one 
where, given the rigidity of the market and in the absence of a global 
market, the vulnerability of the importing side to interruption of Ňows—no 
matter whether caused by natural, technical, or political circumstances—
varies inversely with the number of suppliers. Thus, Azerbaijani gas has 
been and will be determinant for Turkey in order to downgrade the risk 
associated with the excessive concentration of gas suppliers, i.e. with the 
dominant position of Russian gas in national supply system.
Under this perspective, the mentioned ͞double role͟ played by 
Azerbaijan on the regional energy chessboard—i.e. producer and poten-
tial transit country—oīers Turkey advantages in diversification terms, 
which go beyond the already relevant Ƌuota of the market enjoyed by 
Shah Deniz gas. Indeed, ever since the initial opening of the Azerbaijani 
energy sector, the infrastructural projects along the Caucasian-Anato-
lian axis were inextricably linked with the possibility of exporting the 
hydrocarbons produced in Central Asian fields along the same route. 
That is, the Caucasian-Anatolian axis has been traditionally perceived 
by its stakeholders as a vital component of a wider East-test energy 
corridor, linking the wider Caspian producing area to European markets.
123The possibility for Turkey to multiply hydrocarbon supply sources 
exploiting the trans-Caspian route and Azerbaijan transit potential are 
closely connected with the third potential economic benefit resulting 
from the energy partnership with Baku, i.e. the possibility to take ad-
vantage of the strategic location of the country, carved in between the 
main Eurasian energy producing and consuming areas, to promote a 
regional hub role. That is, by maximizing supply channels and import 
volumes Turkey may re-export its hydrocarbon surplus, thereby reducing 
the elevated costs associated with import dependency.
Summing up, the growing relevance of Azerbaijani gas export—as 
well as the potential associated with in the country’s transit role—be-
stow Turkey with a hybrid nature vis à vis its land-locked partner, as 
it stands simultaneously as a transit and a client country. Raising the 
benefits and the interests in the transit trade, Turkey’s hybrid nature 
scales down the degree of dependency and vulnerability of Azerbaijan, 
enhancing its bargaining power within the bilateral relationship.
dhe interest of third parties in the transit trade
The interest of Turkey, as a transit country, in Azerbaijani hydrocarbon 
trade has traditionally gone far beyond the mere economic benefits 
resulting from its hybrid nature. Rather, it took on a political dimen-
sion strictly associated with the interest of third parties in the transit 
trade—i.e. with the second factor impinging favorably upon Azerbaijan’s 
degree of land-lockedness.
In the post-bipolar environment the possibility for Turkey to 
solve the ͞double coupling dilemma͟ has been strictly associated with 
the infrastructural projects proposed along the Central Asian-Cauca-
sian-Anatolian axis. That is, in advancing the East-test energy corridor 
vision, Turkey was not only serving its own national economic interest, 
but also helping advance its testern partners’ regional strategy. The 
Turco-centric infrastructural project served, in particular, the US key aim 
of supporting newly independent states’ sovereignty and independence, 
simultaneously limiting Russian regional inŇuence and preventing the 
spread of the Iranian one18. This ͞dual containment͟ logic had its main 
fulcrum in Turkey, a bi-directional bridge allowing Caspian hydrocarbons 
to move westward while channeling testern values, norms, and insti-
tutions eastward in the wider context of the proposition of a ͞Turkish 
18 As per the drivers and means of US regional policies, see Frappi (2014).
124 model͟ for institutional and economic development. Therefore not only 
third party interests have always been at play in the energy trade, but 
they also overlapped to a great extent with the Turkish ones, provid-
ing the joint Turkish-Azerbaijani infrastructural projects with a political 
significance to Ankara as relevant as the economic one.
thile the interest of US and British stakeholders in the exploita-
tion of Azerbaijani extractive potential arose well before the country’s 
independence and represented one of the most important incentives 
for Turkey’s regional projection at the same time, Baku’s policies were 
nonetheless crucial in anchoring third party interests to its own strategy 
for development. This was particularly evident in the case of the so-called 
͞Contract of the Century͟ through which, in September 1994, Azerbaijan 
ceded exploration and production rights to the Azerbaijan International 
Oil Company (AIOC) on the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oilfield—which would 
have fed the BTC pipeline. Consistently with the will of Azerbaijan’s 
leadership, the consortium was formed according to an inclusive logic, 
explicitly designed to provide the country with a diplomatic shield, which, 
securing strong multinational commercial interests backed by respective 
governments, would have acted as an ͞insurance policy͟ for Azerbaijan’s 
new-found independence (Pashayev 2009, p. 114.)
tith the beginning of the new century and the progressive shift 
of the extractive industry’s focus from the oil to the gas sector, the US 
took a back-seat position in the regional energy competition19, leaving 
to the EU the ͞responsibility to lead͟ the implementation of further 
pipeline projects on the Caucasus-Anatolian axis, consistently with its 
own supply diversification needs. Indeed, ever since the publication of 
the European Commission’s 2000 Green Paper on energy security, the 
exploitation and transportation of the Caspian Basin gas resources become 
a priority vector of the policies aimed at safeguarding EU energy security 
from outside its borders (European Commission 2001, pp. 23 and 37).
Resulting in the resolve to inaugurate the fourth EU external 
gas supply channel—the so-called Southern Corridor—Brussels’ energy 
diversification policies ended up in revolving around Turkey’s energy 
bridging role between consuming and production areas. This, in turn, 
further raised Ankara’s economic and political stakes in the exploitation 
of Azerbaijani natural wealth and transit potential. 
19 US partial retreat from the Caspian energy competition did not result in the disinterest 
in it. Yuite on the contrary the thite ,ouse resolutely supported EU energy diversification policies 
(see Frappi 2014). 
125First and foremost, the high degree of convergence between 
Brussels’ and Ankara’s energy security strategies—both revolving around 
the need to diversify supply sources in order to reduce over-dependence 
on Russian gas imports—allowed Turkey to directly benefit in economic 
terms from EU projection toward the Caspian area. That is, supporting 
EU regional energy policies helped Turkey advance two of its main en-
ergy policy goals, i.e. meeting a growing domestic gas demand through 
diversified sources and advancing the energy hub vision for the country. 
Simultaneously, and from a political perspective, the key role played by 
Turkey in the development of the Southern Corridor project enhanced 
the country’s standing vis à vis both European consumers interested in 
diversifying import channels and producers in the wider Caspian area 
interested in diversifying export outlets. Against this backdrop, it is 
hard to underestimate the importance attached by Ankara to its rising 
strategic significance to European consumers’ energy security policies. 
In particular, becoming a ͞key actor͟20 to EU diversification policy was 
all the more important since the implementation of the Southern Cor-
ridor vision overlapped in time with the granting to Turkey of candidate 
status for EU membership at first, and with the opening of the related 
negotiations successively.
In sum, the interest of third parties—both energy producers 
and consumers—in current and potential hydrocarbon trade along the 
Turkish-Azerbaijani axis stands, on the one hand, as a crucial factor in 
downgrading both the measure of Azerbaijan’s land-lockedness and the 
gap in bargaining power between the two partners.
The land-locked country’s retaliatory capability
Turkey’s strong economic and political interest in developing the EU 
Southern gas Corridor—testified by its inclusion among the four main 
goals of its national energy strategy21—stood as the main factor providing 
Azerbaijan with a retaliatory capability vis à vis its partner. Nowhere the 
latter emerged clearer than in relation to the crisis in bilateral relations 
resulting from the October 2009 signing of the Turkish-Armenian urich 
Protocols on opening diplomatic relations and the common border. In-
20 The expression is borrowed from the 2007 EU Enlargement Strategy (European Com-
mission 2007, p. 11).
21 Contributing to Europe’s energy security represents one of the main goals of Turkish 
energy strategy, along with supply diversification, increase in the share of renewables and increase 
in energy eĸciency (Republic of Turkey 2016). 
126 deed, by virtue of the protocols, Ankara’s government tried de facto to 
decouple the path toward normalization of relations with zerevan from 
the resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conŇict over Nagorno-Kara-
bakh—whose occupation in April 1993 by Armenian forces represented 
the primary cause for the closing of the border, as well as for the freezing 
of the normalization attempts carried out since the USSR’s dissolution.
Ankara’s unilateral opening to zerevan, pursued outside prior 
consultation with Baku, resulted for Azerbaijan in an unprecedented 
͞risk of abandonment͟ from the alliance with Turkey (Snyder 1984). 
ConseƋuently, in the context of an asymmetric and heterogeneous 
alliance, Azerbaijan reacted to Turkey’s move by leveraging upon its 
muted bargaining power—and, therefore, upon its enhanced retaliatory 
capability. Baku benefited, in particular, from the concomitance between 
the urich process and the bilateral negotiations with Turkey on the 
renewal of the gas supply contract and on the laying of the pipelines 
along the EU Southern Corridor. Thus, Baku’s retaliatory capability pri-
marily took the form of a ͞threat of realignment͟ with Turkish energy 
rivals in the competition for the transportation of Azerbaijani gas. In 
fact, in a short timeframe following the signing of the urich Protocols, 
Socar re-vitalized negotiations for gas transport along Russian, Iranian, 
and Black Sea routes toward Romania and Bulgaria22, jeopardizing the 
basic aims of Ankara’s energy strategy and related foreign policy goals.
thile it would be misleading to attribute the sole responsibly for 
the derailment of a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement to the Azerbaijani 
reaction, it nevertheless definitively represented a key obstacle to its 
implementation. Capitalizing on the inŇuence exerted by means of its 
energy potential, Baku proved therefore able to aīect the outcome of 
the normalization process and, most importantly, to impose a revision 
of the bilateral relation with Ankara on more favorable terms. The lat-
ter essentially took the form of an enhanced cooperation in both the 
energy and security sector: besides finalizing a new gas supply contract 
and the intergovernmental agreement for laying down a dedicated gas 
pipeline, Ankara and Baku formalized military ties with the signing of 
a partnership and mutual assistance agreement (͞Azer News͟ 2010). 
The re-launching of the bilateral energy partnership was particularly 
relevant for the distribution of power within the alliance. It paved the 
way for the Ňowing of massive Azerbaijani investments in Turkey—all 
22 See, for example I,S Markit 2009a; I,S Markit 2009b; SOCAR News 2010; I,S Markit 
2010.
127the more relevant since Baku’s retaliatory capability vis à vis Ankara, 
enjoyed by virtue of bilateral negotiations on gas and exploited during 
the ͞Protocol Crisis ,͟ naturally faded with the finalization of the men-
tioned intergovernmental agreements on gas sales and transportation. 
Indeed, due to the peculiarities of gas marketing, once comprehensive 
agreements are reached and once upstream and midstream investments 
are launched, the room for bargaining shrinks and the partners turn out 
to be bounded together over the long-term by legal arrangements as 
well as by a mutual interest in trade, i.e. by functional interdependence. 
Therefore, the current strategy aimed at scaling down dependency on 
Turkey as the key transit country is rather based upon the enhancement 
of the control exerted by Azerbaijan’s state oil company on both the 
Turkish transport system and the energy market.
The degree of control the land-locked state exercises over the transport 
systems
Sustained by the increasing financial power ensured by the energy rents, 
the second phase of Azerbaijani energy development has been focusing 
on the attempt to consolidate its role as energy exporter, along a dual 
track strategy. That is, besides investing in the upstream sector—i.e. in 
the development of second and third generation national fields—Baku 
initiated a ͞going abroad͟ strategy hinged on the participation of SOCAR 
the whole energy value chain. The resulting investment strategy in the 
midstream and downstream sectors primarily targeted its current and 
forthcoming gas transit countries along the EU Southern Corridor, with a 
particular focus on Turkey. Since 2009, the latter indeed became the first 
recipient of Azerbaijani FDI ouƞlow, targeting energy and infrastructural 
sectors chieŇy. The Ňow of Azerbaijani investments to Turkey jumped 
from a cumulative amount of 81 million US dollars in the decade be-
tween 2000 and 2010 to 3,125 million between 2011 and 201423. As a 
conseƋuence, according to Baku’s Ministry of Economy24, the stock of 
Azerbaijani FDI in Turkey reached 8 billion US dollsrs in mid-2016 and it 
is expected to rise up to 20 billion by the beginning of next decade—
making Azerbaijan the first foreign investor in the country.
The main pillar of Baku’s investment strategy in Turkey is the 
Trans-Anatolian gas Pipeline (TANAP). It is a joint Azerbaijani-Turkish 
23 Author’s calculation based upon: Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Economy, Foreign 
irect /nvestments in durŬey, various editions.
24 Trend (2016).
128 initiative, launched in November 2011, and aimed at tackling the fi-
nancial and political shortcomings in EU-sponsored gas transportation 
projects between Anatolia and central Europe through the assumption 
of direct responsibility for the construction and operation of a pipeline 
connecting Turkey’s eastern and western borders. Designed as the cen-
tral segment of the pipelines system linking Caspian fields to southern 
European gas markets25, TANAP perfectly matches both Azerbaijani and 
Turkish energy and foreign policy strategies in both the short and mid 
term. In particular, the scalability in its transport capacity from an initial 
16 to 31 billion cubic meters per year is intended to allow the inaugu-
ration of the EU Southern Corridor by 2019. thile making it possible, 
over the mid and long terms, to accommodate the transportation of 
gas extracted in Azerbaijan’s third generation field as well as in Near 
Eastern and Caspian producing areas potentially connectable to Anatolia. 
Against this backdrop, a crucial element in Azerbaijani investment strategy 
has been the resolve to keep the majority stake in the infrastructural 
project, thereby accepting to bear the highest financial burden for its 
implementation in order to retain the control over its management as 
well as over the associated decision-making processes26.
Significantly, besides investments in infrastructures Azerbaijani FDI 
also targeted the Turkish energy transformation and distribution sec-
tors. In this context, the main results of the Azerbaijani ͞going abroad͟ 
strategy in Turkey were the SOCAR acƋuisition of the majority stake 
(currently 56.32й) in Petkim, Turkey’s largest petrochemicals company, 
and construction of the STAR oil refinery, the first private-led initiative 
of the kind, which after 2018 will allow Turkey to reduce its dependence 
on foreign refined oil products27.
25 TANAP is going to be connected, on the Caucasus front, with the expanded SCP while, 
on the Thracian one, with the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, devoted to transport 10 Bcm/y of gas from 
the Greek border to South-Eastern Italy, with possible spin-oīs to Bulgaria and the Balkans.
26 Nowhere Baku’s resolve to retain control over strategic decision-making emerged clearer 
than in negotiations over possible transfer of shares to interested energy companies. At the time 
of its inception, SOCAR detained the 80й of TANAP consortium and refused to sell cumulatively 
more than 29й of the Ƌuota either to Total, Statoil or Turkish company explicitly referring to the 
will of retaining not less than 51й as well as the ͚last word’ over strategic decisions—such as 
potential additional suppliers. ConseƋuentially SOCAR currently detains 58й of the consortium’s 
shares, while the Turkish company BOTAb and BP respectively detain the remaining 30й and 12й. 
Accordingly, SOCAR is expected to contribute to the 9.3 billion USD project with 5.3 billion.
27 For an overview of current Azerbaijani investment in Turkish energy sector and ob-
stacles to further developments, see Rzayeva (2015).
129Conclusion: The regional implications of the reduced poǁer asymmetry 
Over the last 25 years, energy cooperation has been the leitmotiv behind 
the emergence and successive enhancement of the bilateral partnership 
between Turkey and Azerbaijan, facilitating the pursuit of both actors’ 
national interests in economic as well as political terms. Indeed, energy 
cooperation with Baku not only ensured Turkey the safeguard of national 
energy security needs, but also presided over the rise of the country’s 
strategic significance and bargaining power vis à vis energy consumer 
and producer countries interested in diversifying respective import or 
export channels. Under this perspective, energy cooperation with Baku 
has been crucial to Ankara in order to tackle the post-bipolar double 
coupling dilemma. This holds true not only for the period immediately 
following the dissolution of the USSR, but also with reference to the AKP 
government era, as a result of the ͞economization͟ trend in Ankara’s 
foreign policy choices28.
The growing relevance of the energy sector to foreign policy and 
the connected enhancement of the Turkish-Azerbaijani partnership upon 
an interdependent base went along with the progressive reduction in 
the bargaining power gap between Ankara and Baku. Although the po-
litical land-lockedness remains an unavoidable corollary of the lack of 
access to the sea—along with the associated vulnerability—Azerbaijan 
nevertheless managed in downgrading its measure. It exploited the in-
centives-disincentives system enjoyed by virtue of its energy potential 
in order to prevent Turkey from disaligning, as well as to relaunch and 
strengthen the partnership on a more favorable base. 
As demonstrated by the outcome of the ͞Protocol Crisis ,͟ the 
growing importance attached by Ankara to the partnership with Baku 
along with the growth in the latter’s bargaining power results in Turkish 
Caucasian policy being not only centered upon Arzebaijan, but to a great 
extent also inŇuenced by the latter. That is, the partner’s priorities and 
the partnership’s common agenda and shared goals end up reducing 
Turkish room for diplomatic maneuver and reinforcing the traditional 
vectors of its Caucasian policy, i.e. the engagement of Georgia and the 
containment of Armenia.
As far as the latter is concerned, in a regional context where the 
Armenian Genocide, the Turkish-Armenia normalization process, and the 
28 See KiriƔci (2009); KiriƔci and KaptanoŒlu (2011).
130 Nagorno-Karabakh conŇict issues tightly overlap, creating an inextricable 
diplomatic short-circuit, the gradual balancing of the Turkish-Azerbaijani 
relationship seems to add an additional polarization factor, and, simulta-
neously, an additional hurdle to the coherent and inclusive development 
of the area. In fact, Azerbaijan managed in re-launching and further 
hardening Turkish containment policy versus Armenia, making Ankara a 
key partner in the strategy aimed at isolating zerevan. A strategy that, 
given the persistent impossibility of achieving a negotiated settlement 
of the Karabakh conŇict, aims to capitalize on the exclusion of Arme-
nia from the major Caucasian cooperation and infrastructure projects, 
deepening the already dire conseƋuences of the closure of the Eastern 
and testern borders of the country29.
The reverberations over Turkish-Georgian relations of the enhanced 
partnership with Baku are, ostensibly, opposite in sign. The relevance of 
Georgia as a physical and political link between Turkey and Azerbaijan 
presided over the gradual but steady formation of a trilateral axis for 
cooperation, progressively institutionalized by the launch of tripartite 
formats for cooperation. Therefore, as far as Georgia is concerned, energy 
cooperation had relevant spill-over eīects, which fostered a tripartite 
engagement—in wider economic, financial, and security terms—and put 
forward a new model for transnational and interregional cooperation 
in the Caucasus area30.
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